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The Exigent Circumstances Exception
To the Warrant Requirement
by H. Patrick Furman

T

U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of the people to
to the
be
free from
Amendment
unreasonable
he Fourth
searches and seizures. Colorado Constitution Article II, § 7 makes the same
guarantee in virtually identical language. Searches conducted without warrants are "per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to few specifically established and well
delineated exceptions."' One of these exceptions is the exigent circumstances
exception, 2 which this article discusses.

General Principles and
Procedures
A defendant, as the moving party in a
suppression hearing, has the burden of
proof. However, because a warrantless
search and seizure is presumptively illegal, the defendant can satisfy that burden merely by establishing that the police did not have a warrant.' The prosecution then has the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. 4 This general rule applies with
full force at hearings in which it is argued that the exigent circumstances exception applies.5
Proof that an exigent circumstance
exists requires, first and foremost, proof
that probable cause exists. An exigent
circumstance is not a substitute for probable cause. It is merely an exception to

Column Ed.: H. Patrick Furman
of the University of Colorado
School of Law, Boulder-492-8126

the warrant requirement in a situation
where probable cause already exists.
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing probable cause, just as it
bears the burden of establishing the exigent circumstance itself.6
As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception must be narrowly
drawn. If doubt exists about whether
the decision to search was reasonable,
"such doubt must be resolved in favor
of the defendant whose property was
searched."7
The exigent circumstances exception
is broken down into three main categories:
1) the bona fide pursuit of a fleeing
suspect;
2) situations that create a risk of the
immediate destruction of evidence;
and
3) colorable claims of an emergency
threatening the life of another.8
Proof that a particular set of facts falls
into any of these categories suffices to
meet the requirements of the exigent
circumstances exception. However, it is
not unusual for a particular set of facts
to fall into more than one category. For
example, a suspect who flees with a hostage may create a situation that falls into both the bona fide pursuit and the
life-threatening emergency categories.
The following sections discuss the three
categories in detail.

Hot Pursuit
The bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect is recognized by both the U.S. and

Colorado Supreme Courts as an exigent
circumstance that may justify a warrantless search.9 In Warden v. Hayden,10
witnesses followed a robbery suspect
from the scene of the robbery to a home.
The police arrived minutes later. The
U.S. Supreme Court was satisfied that
the exigencies of the situation justified
an entry into and a thorough search of
the home. The search included such actions as looking in the washing machine
and the tank of a recently flushed toilet,
which were approved "as part of an effort to find a suspected felon, armed,
within the house into which he had run
only minutes before."'
As suggested above, the facts of this
case fit into more than one category of
exigent circumstances. The Court was
concerned with both officer safety and
the possibility of further flight.
An issue that may arise in the context
of a claim that the "hot pursuit" exception applies to a warrantless search is
whether the pursuit was bona fide. In
People v. Santisteven, the Colorado Court
of Appeals rejected a claim of hot pursuit when
the police had information that the
defendant was in his own home, approximately two hours after the stabThis newsletter is prepared by the
CriminalLaw Section of the Colorado
Bar Association. This month's column
was written by H. Patrick Furman,
Boulder, a clinical professor of law at
the Legal Aid & Defender Programat
the University of ColoradoLaw School.
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bing. They had no evidence that he Evidence of the arrest of a person leavwas leaving and, indeed, the house ing a house that is under surveillance is
was surrounded by six uniformed offi- not an exigent circumstance in the abcers to prevent that eventuality.1 2
sence of some evidence that those in the
Conversely, in a similar situation, the house would be alarmed by that perColorado Supreme Court found that the son's absence."
hot pursuit exception extended to a susThe danger of loss or destruction
pect who was surrounded hours after must be more than speculative. As the
his offense. In People v. Drake, 3 the po- Colorado Supreme Court stated in Peolice had probable cause to believe the ple v. Thrner,
defendant was involved in a murder
[t]o justify a warrantless entry and
earlier in the day and that he was planseizure on the basis of destruction of
ning to leave town. They traced the deevidence, the perceived danger must
fendant to a motel room and surroundbe real and immediate.' 8
ed it. The court found that the police The simple fact that the evidence inreasonably feared that the defendant volved can be destroyed easily (like most
might attempt to escape once it became drugs) does not, by itself, amount to
dark. This danger, coupled with the seri- proof that a real danger of loss or deousness of the offense and the danger struction exists.19
that the defendant might destroy evidence in the motel room, satisfied the
court that exigent circumstances existed
"A danger of the loss or
to justify the warrantless arrest of the
destruction of evidence arises
defendant.
most frequently in drug
It is important to note that, in Drake,
more than one exigency existed. Both
cases, because drugs often
the risk of flight and the danger of deare easily destroyed."
struction of evidence were present and
were used to justify the warrantless arrest of the defendant and the search of
his motel room.
The question of whether this exigent
circumstance exists must be evaluated
Destruction of Evidence
in light of the principle that the police
A danger of the loss or destruction of should obtain a warrant whenever feasievidence arises most frequently in drug ble. According to the Thrner court:
cases because drugs often are easily deThe question is whether there is a real
stroyed. The principles to be applied
or substantial likelihood that the conwhen the prosecution seeks the applicatraband or known evidence on the
tion of this exception are reasonably
premises might be removed or declear.
stroyed before a warrant could be obThe burden of proving the applicabilitained.20
ty of the loss or destruction exception
The loss or destruction exception also
rests on the prosecution. In People v. arises in situations where the evidence
Garcia,the Colorado Supreme Court itself is transitory. The alcohol in a drivstated:
er's blood is the most common example
The threat of immediate destruction of this type of evidence. The Colorado Suor removel of evidence constitutes an preme Court has held that evidence of
exigent circumstance if the prosecu- the amount of alcohol in a driver's blood
tion can demonstrate that the police can be admitted in a vehicular homicide
had an articulable basis to justify a prosecution, even when it has been obreasonable belief that evidence was tained over the driver's objection. It is
about to be removed or destroyed.14
admissible as long as:
1) there is probable cause to arrest
A reasonable belief that evidence is
about to be removed or destroyed has
the driver on an alcohol-related
traffic offense;
been proved to the satisfaction of the
2) there is a clear indication that a
Colorado Supreme Court by evidence
that the suspects actually have obblood test will provide useful eviserved police surveillance.' 5 Evidence
dence;
3) there are exigent circumstances
that the suspects may be alerted to the
presence of the police by the fact that
that make it impractical to obtain
one of their confederates has been ara warrant; and
rested also may serve to establish a rea4) the test is reasonable and is consonable fear of destruction of evidence.16
ducted in a reasonable manner.21
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The court held that the necessary exigent circumstance was provided by the
fact that alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after the drinking stops,
regardless of what the police or the suspect does. 22

Emergency Exception
In the 1983 case ofPeople v. Clements,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that
"a bona fide public emergency is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement." 23 The
court, having previously recognized the
existence of the emergency doctrine,
first approved the application of the doctrine in a 1977 case, People v. Amato.24
In Amato, police, fire and ambulance
personnel were dispatched on an emergency call concerning a possible drug
overdose. They were directed to the
bathroom of an apartment, where they
found the defendant suffering an apparent drug overdose. Drug paraphernalia
were observed in plain view on a toilet
in the bathroom by a fireman, who pointed them out to a policeman. More paraphernalia were found on the defendant's
person during a cursory search by the
police at the hospital. The trial court
found that no emergency justified these
warrantless searches and suppressed
the items. The Colorado Supreme Court
reversed.
The court did not engage in a detailed
analysis of the emergency exception.
Rather, the court simply noted that the
police and fire personnel were at the
apartment in response to an emergency
call with the primary purpose of rendering assistance. They were not searching
for evidence. They found it in plain view
in the bathroom. The court found that
these acts fit within even the "strictest
possible formulation of the emergency
rule."25
In People v. Martin,26 the Court of Appeals ruled on an emergency situation
that occurred when the defendant was
injured in a fall from a balcony at the
home where she worked. The police and
ambulance were called. As the defendant was being transported to the hospital, she expressed concern about a coat
she had left in the home. The police
went to get the coat and noticed some
cash, which belonged to the defendant,
lying on a counter. They decided to put
the money in her coat. Before putting it
in the coat pocket, a policeman looked in
the pocket, allegedly to make sure there
were no sharp objects in the pocket that
might hurt him. Inside the pocket, he
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saw a bindle. The bindle was found to
contain cocaine.
The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, holding that the search of the
coat pocket fell within the emergency
exception. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the argument that any
emergency ended once the defendant
was in the ambulance on the way to the
hospital. The court held that emergency
follow-up procedures fall within the
scope of the emergency and that the decision to put the money in the coat pocket was not unreasonable. The court further found that, in light of the police officer's training and experience, his decisions to check the pocket first and to
seize and search the bindle were not unreasonable.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently
noted some limits on the emergency doctrine. In People v. Wright,27 the defendant was in an automobile accident.
Paramedics gave her purse to a police
officer, who brought it to the hospital
where the paramedics had taken the defendant. The defendant was coherent
and under the care of hospital personnel
when the officer decided to look in her
purse for evidence of identification so
that he could complete his reports. He
found drugs and drug paraphernalia.
The trial court suppressed this evidence, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
rejecting the argument that this search
was justified under the medical emergency exception to the warrant requirement. The court found that there was no
medical emergency because the defendant already was receiving appropriate
treatment, and the officer was not looking for information to help in the treatment.
Another type of emergency situation
that falls within the exigent circumstances exception involves general
threats to public safety. In People v.
Higbee,28 the Colorado Supreme Court
reversed a trial court order suppressing
physical evidence seized during a search
of the defendant's apartment. The search
was based on the statement of a police
informant-who had purchased a controlled drug from the defendant-that
the defendant had what appeared to be
dynamite rigged to a switch in his car.
The informant stated that the defendant bragged about how he could explode the dynamite either with the
switch or by a timing device. The police
later observed the defendant carrying
items from his car into his apartment.
They arrested him and searched his car.
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During the car search, the police
found the switch described by the informant, but they did not find any dynamite. The police cleared the area, called
the bomb squad and searched the defendant's apartment. The search revealed
narcotics, not explosives. Based on this
and other information, the police obtained a warrant to search the apartment. The trial court found no emergency and suppressed the use of the evidence obtained in the search. However,
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed
the order.
The court was satisfied that there
was probable cause to believe an explosive device was located in the defendant's apartment and that the possible
presence of the device gave rise to exigent circumstances that justified the
warrantless search. The court notes
that the trial court should review the totality of the circumstances, including
the time necessary to obtain a warrant,
the character of the investigation and
the risk posed by delay. The dynamite
had great explosive force; a number of
people already had been evacuated from
the area (an apartment complex); there
was the danger of an explosion delayed
by the timing device about which the defendant had bragged; and a warrant
might take two to three hours to obtain.
Based on all these factors, the Supreme
Court stated, "We believe that an emergency situation justifying the warrantless entry was adequately established
under the standards articulated in Malczewski." 29
People v. Malczewski had involved the
safety of a baby in an apartment.3 0 A police officer on routine patrol was told by
the defendant's wife that the defendant
had the couple's baby in the family
apartment. She was concerned about
the safety of the baby because the defendant had been drinking. The officer
went to the apartment and knocked on
the door. The defendant came to the
door, but did not open it. As the parties
spoke through a window, the officer
could hear a baby crying in the background. After a while, the defendant
brought the baby to the door. Eventually, the defendant began fighting with the
officer while still holding the baby. When
a second officer arrived, the defendant
was subdued.
In Malczewski, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the emergency exception justified the warrantless entry into
the defendant's apartment. The court
described the emergency exception in
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terms somewhat broader than it used in sulting discovery and seizure of the
other cases:
drugs was constitutionally permissible.
The emergency variant of the exigent The mere fact that the police suspected
circumstances exception requires a there was criminal activity afoot did not
showing of an immediate crisis inside turn their actions into a pretext for an
the home and the probability that po- unconstitutional criminal investigation.
lice assistance will be helpful in alleviating that crisis.31
Conclusion
The court also reiterated that the trial
The exigent circumstances exception
court should examine the totality of the to the warrant requirements is a flexicircumstances as they appeared to the ble exception and has been applied in a
police officer at the time of the warrant- variety of situations. However, practiless entry.
tioners should remember that this exA public emergency also was found to ception, like any other exception to the
exist in Clements.32 The emergency warrant requirement, should be nararose when a police officer smelled ether rowly tailored. The state and federal conin the trunk of a car in an apartment stitutions, and the opinions interpreting
complex parking lot. Expert testimony those constitutions, express unambiguestablished that ether, when allowed to ous support for the principle that warstand, is unstable, spontaneously com- rants should be obtained whenever feabustible and highly explosive. The police sible. Exigent circumstances may justify
searched the car under the supervision violating this principle, but claims of
of hazardous materials experts and such exigencies always should be examfound, in addition to the ether, con- ined with care.
trolled substances and other incriminating evidence.
NOTES
The trial court found that there was a
colorable claim of emergency but also

found that the police had "used the potential emergency as a pretext for entering the trunk." The court further found
that the police could have alleviated the
emergency in a less intrusive manner.33
Based on this finding, the trial court
concluded that the discovery of the
drugs in the trunk was not inadvertent.
Thus, the court found that the discovery

was not covered by the plain-view exception. The trial court suppressed the
evidence seized from the trunk.
The Supreme Court reversed the suppression order, holding that the trial
court finding that an emergency existed
was well founded and that the police actions to neutralize the danger were reasonable and narrowly tailored. The
court specifically held that the entry into the trunk was reasonable and the re-

1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967); People v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 570

(Colo. 1988).
2. Other exceptions currently recognized
could arguably be said to include abandonment, People in the Interest of D.E.J., 686

P.2d 794 (Colo. 1984); consent, People v.
Lowe, 616 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1980); drug screens

in connection with "sensitive"jobs, Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Association, 489
U.S. 602 (1989); good faith mistake, Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); searches incident to arrest, Maryland v. Buie, 110 S.Ct.
1093 (1990); inventory searches, People v. Inman, 765 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1988); plain view
discovery, Horton v. California, 110 S.Ct.
2301 (1990); and roadblocks, People v. Rister,
803 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990). Additionally, the
probable cause and warrant requirements
are significantly modified in cases involving
schoolchildren, New Jersey v. TL.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985); probationers, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); automobiles,

Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985),
People v. Cagle, 688 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1984);
and bank records, United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976), People v. DiGiacomo,

612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980).
3. People v. Jansen, 713 P.2d 907 (Colo.
1986).
4. People v. Amato, 562 P.2d 422, 423
(Colo. 1977).
5. Jansen, supra, note 3; McCall v.
People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981).
6. Jansen,supra, note 3.
7. Id. at 911-12; citing, Robinson v. State,
388 So.2d 286 (Fla.App. 1980).
8. People v. Miller, 773 P.2d 1053 (Colo.
1989); McCall, supra, note 5.
9. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); Miller, supra,note 8.
10. Warden, supra,note 9.
11. Id. at 299.
12. 693 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Colo.App. 1984).
13. 785 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1990).
14. Garcia,supra,note 1 at 581.
15. People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 538 (Colo.
1981).
16. People v. Bustam, 641 P.2d 968 (Colo.
1982).
17. People v. Turner, 660 P.2d 1284 (Colo.
1983).
18. Id. at 1288.
19. Id.; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30
(1970).
20. Thrner,supra, note 17 at 1288.
21. People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192
(Colo. 1984).
22. Schmerber v. California,384 U.S. 757
(1966).
23. People v. Clements, 661 P2d 267 (Colo.
1983).
24. Supra,note 4.
25. Id. at 424.
26. 19 Colo.Law. 2488 (Dec. 1990) (App.No.
88CA1130, annc'd 10/11/90).
27. 20 Colo.Law. 801 (April 1991) (S.Ct.No.
90SA403, annc'd 2/11/91).
28. 802 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1990).
29. Id. at 1091.
30. 744 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1987).
31. Id. at 66.
32. Supra, note 23.

33. Id. at 270.

Former CBA Employee Wins National Award
Linda Kennerly, practice development administrator for Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson and former employee in the
CBA communications department, has won a first place award in a national communications contest for her work on the CBA's
Colorado Pledge project. She will receive the award from the National Federation of Press Women ("NFPW") in the category of
"Information to the Media: Media Kit" at the NFPW's annual convention in Orlando, Florida.
The award is for the materials written, compiled and distributed to news reporters at the Colorado Pledge project news conference in October, which was hosted by CBA President Jerry Conover. The announcement received national publicity, with
broadcast coverage on the NBC Nightly News, CNN and local channels 2, 4, 7 and 9. Radio coverage included all stations on the
CNN Business Network and local stations, with a highlight on Paul Harvey's radio program. The story was carried by newspapers across the U.S., including The Wall Street Journal.

